On Reading the Constitution by Fein, Bruce
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 90 Issue 6 
1992 
On Reading the Constitution 
Bruce Fein 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bruce Fein, On Reading the Constitution, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1225 (1992). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol90/iss6/5 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 
Bruce Fein* 
ON READING THE CONSTITUTION. By Laurence H. Tribe and 
Michael C. Doif. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1991. Pp. 
144. $18.95. 
In On Reading the Constitution, Laurence H. Tribe1 and Michael 
C. Dorf2 endeavor to dissect various contemporary approaches to con-
stitutional interpretation. The book makes a constructive contribution 
to understanding and critiquing competing theories of interpretation 
but offers no satisfactory substitute that would be less susceptible to 
judicial arbitrariness. 
Tribe and Dorf, in an attempt to develop a coherent approach to 
constitutional interpretation, divagate into such diverse disciplines as 
literature and mathematics. 3 The authors ultimately conclude, how-
ever, that no unitary formula should confine constitutional interpreta-
tion. Thus, they remonstrate against too much reliance on history or 
the textually unratified views of the Founding Fathers (pp. 8-13), 
against reading provisions either in complete isolation or as part of a 
unified philosophical chorus (pp. 21-28), and against eliminating all 
value choices in expounding a charter replete with generalities (p. 33). 
Instead, Tribe and Dorf contend that constitutional interpretation 
should follow common law traditions in which judges announce nar-
row rulings founded on the reasoning of prior cases that conform to 
the central moral value or values in a specific constitutional clause (pp. 
65-80). Tribe and Dorf correctly point out that no school of constitu-
tional interpretation - whether based on original intent, history, tra-
ditions, or precedent - can avoid leaving a large discretionary 
element to the interpreter. In other words, judges will be capable of 
smuggling idiosyncratic value choices into their decisions no matter 
what interpretive theory they embrace. 
But Tribe and Dorf fail adequately to address the danger of judi-
cial overreaching; instead, they champion an open-ended interpretive 
• Private practitioner, Great Falls, VA; syndicated columnist. J.D. 1972, Harvard.-Ecl. 
1. Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard University. 
2. Law Clerk to Associate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, U.S. Supreme Court. 
3. For example, to prove that some value choice is inherent in the interpretive task, Tribe 
and Dorf draw on the standards of mathematical proof expounded by Imre Lakatos. Pp. 87-91. 
According to Lakatos, one method of discrediting a claim that a triangle has been constructed 
with the sum of its angles greater than 180° is by simply asserting that the figure is an imposter. 
With the profundity of Nestor, Tribe and Dorf inform the reader: "In the law there is an analo-
gous device called drawing a distinction without a difference." P. 91. 
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approach which may exacerbate the problem. In the authors' view, 
the interpretation of terms like liberty and property requires basic value 
choices, and "[c]onstitutional value choices cannot be made ... with-
out recourse to a system of values that is at least partially external to 
the constitutional text,, (p. 66). Thus, in discussing the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses, Tribe and Dorf insist on resorting to 
extraconstitutional sources of authority in the interpretive task (p. 
116). 
But is there no superior alternative to Tribe and Dorf's reliance on 
the personal moral convictions or other idiosyncracies of judges? This 
review will attempt to develop an approach to constitutional interpre-
tation that focuses on the language and purpose of constitutional pro-
visions instead of the personal values of judges. It will then compare 
this alternative approach with the interpretive theory advanced by 
Tribe and Dorf. 
I 
The Constitution was crafted with the overarching goal of check-
ing government tendencies to tyranny or arbitrariness. Trust in the 
benevolence, statesmanship, or wisdom of officeholders in any branch 
was generally eschewed because persons who display such characteris-
tics are rarae aves. As James Madison warned in Federalist 51: 
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human 
nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If an-
gels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on gov-
ernment would be necessary. In framing a government that is to be 
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must 
first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next 
place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, 
the primary control on the government; but experience has taught man-
kind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. 4 
Madison exempted neither members of the federal judiciary from his 
critique of human nature nor the judiciary itself from his call for auxil-
iary institutions or customs to restrain arbitrariness. Concededly, the 
Founding Fathers voiced their greatest concern for legislative tyranny 
because they had repeatedly been first-hand witnesses to that evil. In 
1787, no historical examples existed of abusive exertions of power by a 
genuinely independent judiciary endowed with the power of judicial 
review because the institution was a constitutional innovation. 
But that does not gainsay the Founding Fathers' self-evident desire 
for an interpretive theory that enables judicial performance of its 
checking role, yet acts as an internal restraint on caprice. Further-
more, the history of the Supreme Court suggests that its members are 
typified by mediocrity and a propensity for wrongheadedness urgently 
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 150 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981). 
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in need of a lucid and restraining theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Illustrative, but far from exhaustive, are Dred Scott v. Sandford, 5 
the income tax decisions, 6 the separate but equal doctrine of six de-
cades, 7 the Lochner era of four decades, 8 the Japanese relocation 
cases,9 the criminal justice revolution10 and the reapportionment 
cases11 of the Warren Court, and the ex cathedra pronouncement of 
Roe v. Wade. 12 As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes perspicaciously ob-
served, judges are apt to be naive and simpleminded and desperately 
need education in the obvious.13 
That the Founding Fathers did not envision a Don Quixote role 
for the federal judiciary is manifest. At the constitutional convention, 
for example, delegate Oliver Ellsworth remonstrated against the super-
fluity of the Ex Post Facto Clause: "[T]here was no lawyer, no civilian 
who would not say that ex post facto laws were void of themselves. It 
cannot then be necessary to prohibit them."14 Ellswo_rth's view lost by 
a seven-to-three vote;15 it was understood that the judiciary would not 
be empowered to nullify ex post facto laws on general principles of 
justice or fairness. The majority that ratified the Bill of Rights also 
apparently believed that its protections required amendments to the 
Constitution to obtain legitimacy. 
The Founding Fathers renounced the idea of a federal judiciary 
empowered to protect individual rights through vague principles of 
natural rights or fairness. The Ninth Amendment16 is not to the con-
trary. It is a warning to the judiciary to desist from sustaining federal 
legislative or executive power simply because its assertion would not 
violate a provision in the Bill of Rights. For instance, congressional 
power to regulate the press is not automatically legitimate whenever 
the regulation does not violate the First Amendment. James Madison, 
chief architect of the Bill of Rights, subscribed to that modest purpose 
5. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
6. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan 
& Trust Co., 157 U.S. 601 (1895). 
7. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
8. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex. rel Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
9. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 
U.S. 81 (1943). 
10. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
11. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
13. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, Law and the Court, in CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295 
(1920). 
14. 2 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 376 
(1937). 
15. Id. 
16. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
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of the Ninth Amendment, a conclusion consistent with the virtual ab-
sence of contemporary debate over its inclusion in the Bill of Rights. 17 
Thomas Jefferson presciently warned against a cavalier treatment 
of the constitutional text and urged that amendments were the best 
method of constitutional innovation: 
I had rather ask an enlargement of power from the nation, where it is 
found necessary, than to assume it by a construction which would make 
our powers boundless. Our peculiar security is in possession of a written 
Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction .... Let 
us go then perfecting it, by adding, by way of amendment to the Consti-
tution, those powers which time and trial show are still wanting. 18 
The amendment process, moreover, is not a chimera. Twenty-six 
amendments have surmounted the supermajority rules for constitu-
tional ratification, and most were ratified promptly. The amendment 
process pertains to theories of constitutional interpretation because it 
discredits the idea that only Supreme Court decrees can protect indi-
vidual rights from the majority. The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and 
Twenty-Sixth Amendments, which prohibit voting discrimination 
based on race, gender, or youth, were all proposed and ratified 
predominantly by persons representing middle-aged or elderly white 
males. 
An interpretive theory should not be rejected simply because its 
application leads to an unfetching result in some or many cases. As 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo observed, the Constitution tolerates many 
policies that a judge might think immoral or unfair. Judges empow-
ered to adjudicate according to their individual sense of justice might 
produce a benevolent despotism, but such a regime would put an end 
to the reign of law.19 Justice Holmes echoed those sentiments in ad-
monishing Judge Learned Hand that the judicial duty is not to invoke 
a personal standard of justice but to play the game according to the 
rules.20 
What are those rules for constitutional interpretation? Instead of 
adhering to the idiosyncratic and highly discretionary approach of 
Tribe and Dorf, judges should confine themselves to examining the 
language and evident purposes of constitutional provisions. That stan-
dard minimizes (but does not eliminate) the opportunity for arbitrary 
decrees, yet safeguards the vitality of rights and powers the Constitu-
tion clearly endorses. 
In many instances, the purpose of a provision will be manageably 
17. See 1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 754-55 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (proceedings of Aug. 17, 1789); 
12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 204, 459 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979). 
18. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson C. Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 10 THE WORKS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 10-11 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905). 
19. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 136 (1921). 
20. LEARNED HAND, A Personal Confession, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 306-07 (Irving Dil-
liard ed., 1960). 
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clear from the text. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, for 
example, forbids a state from denying "to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws."21 The equal protection 
language, designed to prevent arbitrary legal classifications or applica-
tions of the law, provides a central check against the tyranny the con-
stitutional Framers so abhorred.22 Applying the language and 
purpose standard, we see that the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson 23 ex-
pounding the separate but equal doctrine was clearly wrong and that 
the overthrow of Plessy in Brown v. Board of Education 24 was clearly 
correct. Legal segregation of the races in public education was arbi-
trary from its inception. It served no public interest consistent with 
the equal protection rights of individuals. A majority's desire to dis-
criminate is not a constitutionally legitimate aim. 
It is irrelevant to the language and purpose standard that all or a 
majority of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers believed that segre-
gated public schooling was consistent with its equal protection stipula-
tion. The amendment's ratifiers approved its language, not the 
concealed or overt understandings of its champions, and omitted any 
express exemption for public schools from its equal protection shield. 
Legislators and laymen commonly trumpet general principles of jus-
tice while remaining utterly indifferent to the inconsistencies between 
these principles and prevailing customs or practices. Intellectual hon-
esty or consistency is not a hallmark of human nature, and legislators 
are exceptionally prone to verbal hypocrisy because of their preoccu-
pation with popularity and reelection. 
John Milton, who elegantly denounced the licensing of the press in 
Aeropagitica, 25 became a censor himself under Cromwell's Common-
wealth and Protectorate.26 Emulating Milton, several members of 
Congress who supported the First Amendment soon thereafter rallied 
behind the 1798 Sedition Act. 27 They were apparently indifferent to 
their intellectual inconsistency because the Sedition Act targeted their 
21. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
22. Thus, Justice Robert Jackson noted in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 
106 (1949): 
I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal Government must exer-
cise their powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some rea-
sonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation. . . . The framers of the 
Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical 
guarantee against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles 
of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. 
336 U.S. at 112. 
23. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
25. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGmCA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINT-
ING TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (Richard c. Jebb ed., 1918). 
26. WILL DURANT & ARIEL DURANT, THE AGE OF Louis XIV 243 (1963). 
27. Representatives Abie! Foster, James Schureman, Thomas Sinnickson and George 
Thatcher voted in favor of both the Bill of Rights and the 1798 Sedition Act. See 5 ANNALS OF 
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political adversaries of the day. Similarly, a majority of Fourteenth 
Amendment champions probably desired an equal protection exemp-
tion for public schools because racial integration would have been po-
litically unpopular. But why should the Supreme Court pay attention 
to these hypocritical desires at war with the unambiguous concept of 
equal protection? If the amendment's ratifiers lacked the political 
courage or honesty to water down its equal protection language, 
courts were certainly not obliged to shore up such cowardice through 
tortured interpretations. That would be unfaithful to the Court's over-
arching mission to check arbitrary rule.28 Ultimately, the language 
and purpose standard of interpretation properly compels intellectual 
honesty from lawmakers - an enormously powerful safeguard against 
arbitrariness. The standard also constrains the interpretive task of 
judges by limiting the role that personal political convictions may play 
in adjudication. 
II 
How would the language and purpose test fare in general opera-
tion, and how does it compare to Tribe and Dorf's interpretive theory? 
Would it minimize the opportunity for judicial smuggling of idiosyn-
cratic values into the Constitution? Tribe and Dorf insist that judges 
must and should make extraconstitutional choices in constitutional in-
terpretation but that they should seek as much guidance from the text 
as possible. That standard simply enlists the Constitution in support 
of judges' personal aims, heedless of the resulting arbitrariness it sanc-
tions. Tribe and Dorf fail to explain why judicial arbitrariness is any 
less menacing than executive or legislative caprice. 
The language and purpose test, in contrast, postulates that arbi-
trariness in government is equally threatening irrespective of its ori-
gins, and it attempts an interpretive constitutional standard that 
simultaneously curbs judicial caprice and retains sufficient judicial 
clout to arrest tyranny in the nonjudicial branches. No Euclidian 
proof exists that the language and purpose test could achieve its in-
tended goals, but a systematic application of this standard to some 
central constitutional questions suggests that it is superior to the ap-
proach of Tribe and Dorf. 
CONGRESS 2113-14 (1798); HI5TORY OF CoNGRESS 169-70 (Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard 
1843). 
28. Of course, the actual text of the Constitution contains several prominent examples of 
intellectual dishonesty and hypocrisy. It tolerated slavery, mandated legal assistance in captur-
ing fugitive slaves, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, treated slaves as three fifths of whites for 
purposes of electoral apportionment, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, and, until 1808, prohibited 
limitations on the slave trade, see U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. All of these provisions conflicted 
with the general constitutional principles of electoral government and the protection of individu-
als from tyranny. But constitutional dignity required incorporation of these unseemly political 
compromises into the constitutional text; they were not effectuated by tacit or express oral under-
standings at the constitutional convention or state ratification conventions. 
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For example, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit both 
the federal government and the states from depriving persons "of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law."29 Due process is 
clearly violated if either a legislative enactment or its enforcement is 
arbitrary or tyrannical, unless the constitutional text elsewhere autho-
rizes such oppression. The general phrase due process does not recog-
nize any exemptions from its renunciation of legal arbitrariness. 
In Bolling v. Sharpe, 30 the Supreme Court held that due process 
prohibited racial segregation in federally operated schools in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Such racial segregation, the Court reasoned, consti-
tuted an arbitrary deprivation of the liberty of black students: it 
served neither an educational nor any other legitimate constitutional 
objective. The language and purpose standard justifies Bolling. That 
many slaveholding framers of the Fifth Amendment did not subjec-
tively intend to proscribe segregated schooling is irrelevant. The lan-
guage they ratified created no due process exception for public schools. 
In contrast, the language and purpose standard would not support 
the Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade 31 decree. There the Court ruled 
that due process permitted meaningful abortion restrictions only dur-
ing the third trimester of pregnancy, and then only if carrying the fe-
tus to term would be emotionally and physically undisturbing to the 
mother. Writing for a seven-to-two majority, Justice Blackmun in-
sisted that a mother's right to terminate a pregnancy is "fundamen-
tal," and that any restrictions on that choice could be justified only by 
a compelling government interest. 32 ·Blackmun deduced a right of pri-
vacy that includes the abortion choice from the Due Process Clause 
and the Ninth Amendment. 
The Roe opinion illustrates the interpretive arbitrariness that 
comes from discarding a language and purpose standard. How did 
Justice Blackmon decide the right to an abortion was fundamental? 
Nothing in the constitutional text either identifies rights as fundamen-
tal or lists directions for their discovery. The Constitution creates no 
hierarchy of rights, crowning some with greater dignity than others, 
but the Roe opinion establishes a hierarchy by judicial fiat. 
How did Justice Blackmun decide that a governmental interest 
must be compelling to restrict the abortion choice? The language and 
purpose of due process requires government rationality, not govern-
ment wisdom or enlightenment. In contrast, the compelling state in-
terest standard leaves judges at sea in their search for government 
goals that are sufficiently important; not a single syllable in the Consti-
tution informs the navigational quest. Neither statutory codes nor leg-
29. U.S. CoNST. amends. V, XIV. 
30. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
31. 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). 
32. 410 U.S. at 155. 
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islative histories customarily identify which laws are passed or votes 
cast in the belief that the government interest to be promoted is 
compelling. 
Tribe and Dorf applaud the Roe decree (pp. 60-64), but their inter-
pretive justification seems feeble. They argue that virtually all inter-
pretation requires resort to value choices external to the Constitution 
(p. 66); seen in this light, Roe can correctly conclude that the liberty to 
choose an abortion is fundamental, even though this right is devoid of 
any supporting constitutional text. Tribe and Dorf ask: "How should 
the Court go about reading the Constitution to determine if an as-
serted right is fundamental?" (p. 73). They never provide a satisfac-
tory answer. First, they attempt no justification for the fundamental/ 
nonfundamental bifurcation of constitutional rights. Second, their 
analysis centers on the extrapolation of fundamental rights from pre-
cedent (pp. 73-80) while eschewing inquiry into the basic correctness 
of the precedent in question. 
Tribe and Dorf assert that ''judges possess the requisite tools to 
make principled distinctions in the selection of a level of generality in 
defining fundamental rights" (p. 114). But this confidence in judicial 
competence and restraint seems misplaced. Tribe and Dorf 's explana-
tion of how their interpretive standard would operate betrays its sus-
ceptibility to judicial manipulation. The authors' attempt to 
characterize government interests as compelling vel non epitomizes in-
terpretive arbitrariness and insults the language and purpose of the 
Due Process Clause. Ultimately, no textual or extratextual constitu-
tional guides, no generally accepted concepts of unenumerated rights, 
and no interpretive rules constrain judicial whimsy. 
How should Roe v. Wade be adjudicated under the language and 
purpose standard? Abortion restrictions rationally support the legiti-
mate government interest in protecting the unborn, a conclusion forti-
fied by various state laws making third-party destruction of a fetus 
murder and recognizing tort and inheritance rights of a fetus after 
birth. Nothing in the politics of abortion suggests that abortion re-
strictions are a pretext for misogyny. Men and women both are 
sharply divided on Roe. Both supporters and opponents of abortion 
restrictions enjoy legislative clout and financial resources; public de-
bate is not skewed in favor of or against either position. Prior to Roe, 
legislative restrictions on abortion were falling rapidly, following the 
lead of California's exceptionally liberal 1967 Therapeutic Abortion 
Act, signed by then-Governor Ronald Reagan.33 No claim that mean-
ingful abortion restrictions are inherently arbitrary would be convinc-
ing. Thus, the restrictions pass the due process language and purpose 
standard of interpretation. 
33. The Act is currently codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE §§ 25950-25958 (West 
Supp. 1992). 
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Review of First Amendment jurisprudence provides another op-
portunity to compare the language and purpose test with the interpre-
tive approach advanced by Tribe and Dorf. The amendment 
prohibits, in part, any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press."34 The amendment's language protects oral and written forms 
of communication, and the institutionalized press, but it does not 
reach all attempts to convey an idea, such as music, painting, dancing, 
or flag burning. On the other hand, the plain purposes of the Free 
Speech and Press Clause justify some embellishment on its language. 
Justice Louis Brandeis in Whitney v. California 35 and Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes in De Jonge v. Oregon 36 ably articulated those 
purposes. They include the discovery and spread of political truths, 
the development of mental faculties, the provision of an emotional 
safety valve for persons disgruntled with government policies, and the 
promotion of government responsiveness to the will of the people. 
These purposes justify a free press interpretation that embraces the 
broadcast media and cable television. Their role in the discovery and 
spread of political truths and in fostering government responsiveness 
to popular opinion is indistinguishable from that of the print media. 
The purposes also justify an interpretation of the Free Speech and 
Press Clause that denounces government suppression of other forms of 
expression. Suppression because of ideological hostility conflicts with 
the truth-seeking, emotional safety valve, and government-responsive-
ness purposes of free speech. 
Tribe and Dorf correctly point out that the Free Speech and Press 
Clause is insufficiently precise to escape all conscientious disputations 
in application {p. 37) but proffer no standards that confine or resolve 
such disagreements. In analyzing an ordinance proscribing all First 
Amendment activity in a city airport, they properly criticize a literalist 
interpretation that would uphold the ordinance on the grounds that 
free speech elsewhere was tolerated. 37 But courts need not adopt a 
fundamental rights theory of the First Amendment - tacitly ad-
vanced by Tribe and Dorf- in order to invalidate the ordinance. The 
prohibition in question would clearly undercut _the purposes of the 
Free Speech and Press Clause by squelching open discourse in a major 
public thoroughfare. Furthermore, the belief that all speech in all 
parts of an airport must be suppressed in order to insure uncongested 
corridors or nonharassment of patrons does not deserve a claim to 
rationality. 
Flag desecration laws would also probably fail to pass constitu-
tional muster under the language and purpose standard. Such laws 
34. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I. 
35. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
36. 299 U.S. 353 (1937). 
37. Pp. 68-69 (citing Board of Airport Commrs. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987)). 
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mean to suppress the idea that the U.S. flag is unworthy of respect and 
flies over a dishonorable or unworthy government. That statutory ob-
jective blatantly conflicts with the free-speech purposes of advancing 
political discourse and offering a safety valve for persons dissatisfied 
with government policy.JS 
General prohibitions on public nude dancing, however, should sur-
vive the language and purpose standard if the prohibitions are even-
handedly enforced. Public displays of nudity fall well outside the First 
Amendment's express language; thus, such activities enjoy constitu-
tional protection only against government restrictions animated by 
ideological hostility. Public nudity may be a method of ridiculing in-
fatuation with dress and clothing. But a ban on such expressive con-
duct does not restrict the countless other communicative vehicles for 
conveying that ridicule. Further, public nudity is unlikely to persuade 
others that a preoccupation with fashions should be abandoned. Thus, 
a contention that general bans on public nudity are inspired by ideo-
logical hostility seems implausible.39 Due process and equal protec-
tion, however, would require that the prohibitions be evenhandedly 
enforced in order to avoid arbitrary and politically motivated targeting 
of violators. 
The Supreme Court's libel law doctrine, which establishes formida-
ble constitutional protection for defamatory factual error, seems 
clearly flawed under the language and purpose interpretive standard. 
In the leading case, New York Times v. Sullivan, 40 the Court held that 
the First Amendment prohibited the award of damages for a falsehood 
defaming a public official absent clear and convincing evidence that 
the culprit acted with actual malice - that is, with knowledge of the 
factual error or in reckless disregard of the truth. Justice Brennan 
insisted that the actual malice rule was essential to the discovery and 
spread of political truths because factual error was "inevitable in free 
debate."41 
But how do factual falsehoods advance the discovery and spread of 
political truths? Falsehoods impede the quest for truth. It is possible 
that fear of factual error would cause self-censorship of many truths, 
and thus the actual malice rule in aggregate advanced a paramount 
free-speech purpose. But Brennan offered not a scintilla of empirical 
evidence to support such a problematic proposition. Further, in the 
decades since Sullivan, no study has indicated that the Court's holding 
enhanced the scope and intellectual rigor of public debate in compari-
38. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
39. The Supreme Court thus correctly decided Barnes v. Glenn Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 
(1991). 
40. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
41. 376 U.S. at 271. 
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son to the pre-Sullivan era. 42 
The religion clauses of the First Amendment prohibit laws "re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof."43 The purposes of the clauses are to prohibit government 
practices intended to coerce or ban religious practice and to deny in-
tended government favoritism toward one religion over another, in-
cluding the establishment of an official church. Furthermore, the Free 
Exercise Clause tacitly acknowledges a legitimate constitutional inter-
est in government facilitation of private religious choice by reducing 
its cost, through tax exemptions for religious property, conscientious 
objection laws, or otherwise. In other words, the Free Exercise Clause 
accepts that government may favor religion over nonreligion. 
The Supreme Court's prevailing Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clause doctrines are woefully misconceived; they are preoccupied with 
unedifying formulas that deflect attention from the language and evi-
dent purposes of the religion clauses. Emblematic is Lemon v. Kurtz-
man. 44 There the Court announced that to survive an Establishment 
Clause challenge, a statute or practice must enjoy a secular purpose, 
must neither materially advance nor inhibit religion, and must avoid 
excessive government entanglement with religion.45 If Lemon were 
celebrated in the observance rather than the breach, then religion 
would be virtually banned from public life. 
Consistent with the Lemon test, Tribe and Dorf defend the 
Supreme Court's invalidation of a "moment of silence" statute in Wal-
lace v. Jajfree. 46 The statute at issue in that case permitted public 
school instructors to commence each school day with a brief period of 
silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer."47 The statute made no 
effort to coerce children into prayer; more generally, the statute fa-
vored neither one religion over another nor religion over nonreligion 
because atheists could employ the moment of silence to wish the ulti-
mate doom of all religion. Yet Tribe and Dorf applaud the Court's 
decision to strike down the statute. This conclusion is consistent with 
the Lemon test's fundamental hostility toward religion and religious 
expression. 
Ultimately, the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence -
epitomized by Lemon and Wallace - is mistaken in demanding that 
government actions necessarily serve a secular purpose. No inherently 
42. Indeed, media reporters generally deny that Sullivan changed investigative or reporting 
customs. I have personally asked more than a score of reporters whether Sullivan caused any 
changes in their reporting behavior. All answered in the negative. I am unaware of any study 
that suggests a contrary conclusion. 
43. U.S. CoNST. amend. I. 
44. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
45. 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
46. 472 U.S 38 (1985). For Tribe and Dorf's discussion, see pp. 45-47. 
47. 472 U.S. at 41. 
1236 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1225 
secular purpose lies behind the provision of legislative chaplains, or 
the words "In God We Trust" on currency, or the reference to God in 
the pledge of allegiance. These practices are intended to favor religion 
over nonreligion. The same was true of the released time program 
sustained in Zorach v. Clauson, 48 conscientious objection laws upheld 
in Gillette v. United States, 49 and property tax exemptions for church 
property validated in Walz v. Tax Commission. so The trilogy reached 
the correct results because all the challenged practices facilitated pri-
vate religious choice and avoided religious coercion or favoritism. 
Evenhanded availability of government premises for religious symbols 
should likewise pass constitutional muster, as should evenhanded par-
ticipation of religious organizations in government programs animated 
by clearly secular goals, such as education, family-planning counsel-
ing, or low-income housing. Thus, the Court has erred in generally 
prohibiting government funding of the educational missions of sectar-
ian and nonsectarian private schools,s1 in proscribing a moment-of-
silence law, s2 and in forbidding a creche display on government 
property.s3 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit government from 
depriving persons of property without due process of law. As ampli-
fied earlier, the Due Process Clauses were intended to proscribe arbi-
trary or oppressive action, often wielded by one economic faction with 
political clout against another with lesser political stature. But the 
prevailing economic rights jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is un-
faithful to the arbitrariness standard. 
Tribe and Dorf permit economic rights barely a cameo appearance 
in their constitutional discourse (pp. 65-66). They recite the now-fa-
miliar critique of the Lochner era,s4 a period from the 1890s to 1937 
when the Court regularly invoked "substantive due process" to over-
turn laws that interfered with the tenets of laissez-faire capitalism. 
They do not renounce Lochner-era jurisprudence for making extracon-
stitutional substantive value choices, however; instead, they conclude 
that it simply made the wrong value choices - wrong because laissez-
faire capitalism did not "meaningfully enhance the freedom of the vast 
majority of Americans in the industrialized age" (p. 66). 
That statement betrays the judicial whimsy that the Tribe and 
Dorf approach to constitutional interpretation invites. How do judges 
determine whether agricultural price supports or countless other gov-
48. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
49. 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
SO. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
51. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
52. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
53. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
54. So named for the seminal case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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emmental manipulations of the marketplace "meaningfully enhance 
the freedom of the vast majority of Americans?" Do they order a na-
tional referendum? Moreover, why should majority economic appe-
tites or envy count, since the Takings, Contract, and Due Process 
Clauses were drafted, in part, to resist, not to surrender to, the clamor 
of the majority for the wealth of the minority? 
The Supreme Court, however, has long endorsed views similar to 
those of Tribe and Dorf. Characteristic of constitutional jurispru-
dence in the field of economic rights is Justice Hugo Black's pro-
nouncement in Ferguson v. Skrupa: 55 
[W]e emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the 
Due Process Clause "to strike down state laws, regulatory of business 
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or 
out of harmony with a particular school of thought." Nor are we able or 
willing to draw lines by calling a law "prohibitory" or "regulatory." 
Whether the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert 
Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours. 56 
Justice Black must·have fantasized in suggesting that legislators con-
sult Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, or any other theo-
rist in fashioning economic statutes. The vast majority have never 
read a syllable of their tomes and are utterly indifferent to economic 
theory. Legislators are earthbound creatures who respond to the 
clamor of special interest groups with money or votes to offer. Their 
summum bonum is reelection, not intellectual tidiness. In Ferguson 
itself, the statute under· review granted lawyers a monopoly on debt 
adjustment. It takes no political genius to surmise correctly which 
interest group fueled the legislative munificence for attorneys. 
In applying its due process rationality test to economic regulation, 
the Supreme Court should stop shutting its eyes to what everyone else 
can see: namely, that the purpose of most economic regulatory stat-
utes is to benefit one class of citizens at the expense of another because 
of political expediency. That political dynamic completely neglects 
the public interest. The monopoly on debt adjustment in Ferguson 
should have been tossed out because it aimed to harm nonlawyer ad-
justers; debtors were not lobbying to curtail their options. But "a bare 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legiti-
mate governmental interest," as acknowledged in United States De-
partment of Agriculture v. Moreno. 57 In summary, if the affiatus for 
economic regulation is to injure or favor one segment of the commu-
nity at the expense of another, then the Supreme Court should give it a 
flunking constitutional grade under the rationality test of the Due Pro-
cess Clause. 
55. 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
56. 372 U.S. at 731-32 (citations omitted). 
57. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
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CONCLUSION 
As the previous examples should demonstrate, the language and 
purpose standard is no panacea for misjudging. The purpose compo-
nent of the standard admittedly leaves a fair amount of intellectual 
discretion consistent with honesty. And Tribe and Dorf are no doubt 
correct that the personal political views of judges often enter into the 
construction of particular constitutional provisions. But the standard 
confines constitutional disagreements within reasonable bounds and 
better insures that judges expound the Constitution, not their subjec-
tive value choices. The best theory of constitutional interpretation is 
one that minimizes arbitrariness or oppression by any branch of gov-
ernment, including the judiciary. The language and purpose standard 
may not be the best, but it seems preferable to the more elusive and 
subjective standard that Tribe and Dorf salute. 
